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cial at the aggregate level,
lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un-
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Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity
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1 Introduction
There now exists a signicant and growing literature on tax reforms in dy-
namic general equilibrium (DGE) models, largely focusing on the aggregate
welfare benets and the distributional e¤ects of permanent reductions in con-
stant capital tax rates. At the aggregate level, studies within a representative
agent framework suggest that tax reforms which reduce capital taxation will
produce welfare gains for the society, even if the tax burden is concurrently
shifted to labour (see e.g. Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Gian-
nitsarou (2006).1 The aggregate welfare benets from tax reforms that reduce
capital taxation are also conrmed in models with heterogeneous agents (see
e.g. Garcia-Mila et. al. (2010)). However, at the same time, heterogeneous
agents models make clear that such reforms will have large redistributive ef-
fects that will disadvantage di¤erent groups in the society (see e.g. Domeij
and Heathcote (2004) and Garcia-Mila et. al. (2010)).2 These results then
suggest that even if they are benecial at the aggregate level, tax reforms
that reduce capital taxes are not likely to be supported by a majority of the
population, unless a compensating mechanism is agreed. It would, of course,
be preferable to nd tax reforms that are Pareto improving since they are
more likely to be implemented.
With the above background in mind, this paper aims to welfare-evaluate
changes in income tax rates for di¤erent types of agents, to investigate which
if any reforms are Pareto improving and if not, which are capable of gener-
ating enough gains to compensate potential losers. In most of the literature
on tax reforms in heterogeneous agent models, agents di¤er proportionately
with respect to their productivity and/or their asset holdings. However, the
research by e.g. Stokey (1996) and Krusell et al. (2000) suggests that the
roles performed by di¤erent types of labour can be structurally distinct in
production. In particular, skilled labour complements capital, whereas un-
skilled labour can substitute for capital.3
1At the same time, at the aggregate level, there is also an important literature that
examines optimal tax policy. The general message from Ramsey optimal taxation is that
the tax rate on capital should be zero in the long-run (see e.g. Chamley (1986), Chari et
al. (1994) and Chari and Kehoe (1999)). This result, however, does not necessarily hold
in models incorporating market failures, see e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999), nor in models
under time-consistent optimal taxation (see e.g. Klein et. al. (2008)).
2Studies that take into account the redistributive e¤ects of capital taxation in designing
optimal taxation in heterogeneous agent models are fewer. In Judd (1985), Ramsey-type
optimal taxation leads to a zero tax on capital in the long run, but this is not a general
result (see e.g. Lansing (1999) and Conesa et. al., (2009)).
3See these papers and the references therein for empirical support regarding these
complementarities/substitutabilities in factor inputs.
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To achieve our objectives, we build on the research which allows for struc-
tural heterogeneity and construct a closed-economy DGE model comprised
of three types of private agents and the government. In particular, the model
contains a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled
workers who all consume output in the product market and supply labour
in the factor market in return for labour income. Additionally, the rst two
income groups, subject to intermediation costs, allocate savings to physical
capital and government bonds in return for capital income whereas unskilled
workers do not save. The representative rm is owned by the capitalist who
hires (skilled and unskilled) labour services and leases physical capital from
the factor market for which it pays the competitive wage and interest rate re-
spectively. Finally, the government taxes economic activity, provides public
spending and issues debt to balance its budget.
We calibrate our model to the UK economy, with the aim of obtaining
a realistic assessment of the likely costs and benets of tax reforms for the
di¤erent agents. Our modeling permits us to capture key features of hetero-
geneity. Following the literature on credit constraints and income inequality
(see e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt
(1998)), nancial intermediation costs allow our model to generate hetero-
geneity in savings. In particular, the heterogeneity in savings predicted by
our model is consistent with the UK data, which suggest that about 30% of
the households in the UK do not save and that the savings of high savers
are about ve times higher than those of low savers. In addition, we use a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specication, following e.g. Stokey
(1996) and Krusell et al. (2000), which assumes di¤erent roles in the pro-
duction function for skilled and unskilled labour. This allows our calibrated
model to produce factor input elasticities and a wage premium that are in
line with empirical studies.
We also relax the assumption of rational expectations, to examine whether
bounded rationality in the form of adaptive learning (see e.g. Evans and
Honkapohja (2001)), can lead to di¤erent conclusions regarding the welfare
costs of tax increases. For instance, Giannitsarou (2006), in a representative
agent model, shows that learners can have lower welfare gains from tax re-
forms, compared to the case of rational expectations. In the case of bounded
rationality, we also consider an additional source of heterogeneity, in the form
of the initial beliefs of the agents regarding the equilibrium laws of motion
(see e.g. Honkapohja and Mitra (2006), for heterogeneity in learning). In
particular, we examine the case where the capitalists are able to predict the
rational expectations solution in the post-reform economy and thus use this
as their initial guess for the parameters of their policy functions, but the
skilled workers cannot and thus use the pre-reform economy to determine
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their policy functions in the rst period after the reform. In other words, for
the capitalists the tax reform is perfectly anticipated, while for the skilled
workers it is unanticipated. This would correspond to an unequal distribution
of information regarding the reform in the economy. As far as we know, this
type of heterogeneity has not been considered in the tax reform literature.
As discussed above, we also di¤er from the previous literature on tax
reforms in heterogeneous agent models, as we model the complementarities
and substitutabilities between the di¤erent types of agents. An additional
di¤erence is in the types of tax reform we consider. In particular, in the tax
reform literature the main interest has been in policy reforms that lowers
the capital tax rate, while increasing the labour tax rate at the same time,
to keep the budget balanced (see e.g. Lucas (1990), Domeij and Heathcote
(2004) and Garcia-Mila et. al. (2010) and, for the UK, Angelopoulos et
al. (2008)). In a heterogeneous agent setup, this implies that cuts in capital
taxes will directly hurt the share of the population whose income is primarily
from labour, thus suggesting that a large part of the welfare losses of these
agents will come from the increased labour taxation. To isolate the e¤ects
of changes in each tax rate on all agents, we consider changes in tax rates
that are not followed by opposite movements in the other tax rates. Instead,
the target for tax reforms is a lower steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio, holding
government spending (excluding interest payment on the debt) xed.
Our proposed analysis is particularly relevant in the current economic en-
vironment as economies struggle to deal with aftermath of the world nancial
crisis in 2007/08. Supply-side reforms, aimed at creating a tax system that
is more e¢ cient and more equitable, have been on the political and economic
agenda for many years.4 Given the burgeoning public debt which has accu-
mulated since the onset of the economic crisis, a number of both demand and
supply side measures are being implemented in countries across the world to
reduce public debt as a share of national income.5 Indeed in the UK, an
increase in the VAT to 20% together with public spending cuts has been an-
nounced. With existing as well as new pressing policy objectives in mind, we
employ our modelling framework to address the issue on whether supply-side
reforms consistent with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead
to a more e¢ cient and equitable economy.
Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while ben-
4See e.g. the research for the Mirrlees Review, at the Institute for Fiscal Studies for
the UK and the discussion on actual tax reforms in Giannitsarou (2006) and Garcia-Mila
et. al. (2010).
5According to data from the OECD for the G-7 (Economic Outlook 87 database), the
UK, France and the US have experienced the largest percentage increases in debt-to-GDP
of 86%, 68% and 58% respectively.
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ecial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the
substitutability of unskilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for
skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its comple-
mentarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing
the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and unskilled
labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity
in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 1 through 3 set out
the model structure, calibration and steady-state and solution respectively.
Section 4 contains the policy analysis and nally Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The closed-economy setup which follows describes the interaction of three
types of private agents and the government in nal goods, labour and asset
markets.
2.1 Population composition
The population size, N , is exogenous and constant. Among N , N c < N
are identical capitalists, N s < N are identical skilled workers, and the rest,
Nu = N N c N s, are identical unskilled workers. Capitalists are indexed by
the subscript c = 1; 2; :::; N c, skilled workers by s = 1; 2; :::; N s and unskilled
workers by u = 1; 2; :::; Nu. There are also N f rms, f = 1; 2; :::; N f . We
assume that the number of rms equals the number of capitalists, N c = N f ;
and that each capitalist owns one rm. It is useful, for what follows, to dene
N c=N = nc, N s=N = ns, Nu=N = nu = 1  nc   ns and N f=N = nf .
2.2 Firms
Each rm produces a single output, Y ft , using physical capital, K
f
t , and
labour services. There are two distinct types of labour that are used in the
production process, unskilled labour, hfu;t, that can be substituted for capital,
and skilled labour, hft , which complements capital.
6 The production function
is given by a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology assumed to take a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specication following e.g. Stokey
(1996) and Krusell et al. (2000):
Y ft = At
h
Kft + (1  )hfu;t
i h
hft
i1 
(1)
6Note that skilled labour also includes the labour services of capitalists.
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where At is exogenous stochastic productivity; 0 < ; (1   ); are the pro-
ductivity of weighted capital and unskilled labor and of skilled labour, re-
spectively; 0 <  < 1 measures the degree of substitutability between capital
and unskilled labour.7
Each rm acts competitively, taking prices and policy variables as given,
and maximises prots given by:
ft  Y ft   rktKft   wthft   wu;thfu;t (2)
subject to the technology constraint given by (1); where wt and wu;t are,
respectively, the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour and rkt is the
interest rate on capital.8 The di¤erent roles in the production function for
skilled and unskilled labour imply that there will be a skill premium for the
former, in the sense that the ratio of wt to wu;t will be larger than unity.
We will calibrate the production function so that the implied factor input
elasticities and the resulting wage premium are in line with empirical studies.
2.3 Budget constraints of capitalists
The representative capitalist owns one rm and receives its prots. He also
receives income from providing skilled labour services, hc;t, to the labour
market and income from interest on his accumulated stock of nancial assets,
in the form of capital, Kc;t, and government bonds, Bc;t. The interest rate
on government bonds is given by rbt . All these sources of income are taxed.
In particular, nancial asset and prot income are taxed at the constant rate
 k, while labour income is taxed at the constant rate h.
We assume that those agents holding assets need to pay intermediation
or transaction premia due to imperfections in capital markets. For instance,
these premia can represent the costs of gathering extra information relating
to legal issues, asset-specic government regulations, intermediation fees and
so on. We follow Persson and Tabellini (1992) and assume a quadratic cost
function such that the capitalist incurs a cost of 'kcK
2
c;t for holding physical
capital and of 'bcB
2
c;t for holding government bonds, where '
b
c; '
k
c > 0 mea-
sures the size of the transaction costs.9 The presence of this capital market
imperfection and of the associated transaction costs help the model to cap-
ture a feature of realism. However, their main contribution here is that they
7Note that when  = 1, unskilled labour serves no purpose in production and the
production function is of the standard Cobb-Douglas form in capital and skilled labour.
8Note that, in equilibrium, prots, ft , are driven to zero due to perfect competition.
9See also Benigno (2009) for intermediation or transaction costs of the form assumed
here, in international nancial markets.
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will allow us, as we shall see below, to capture household heterogeneity in
asset holdings.10
The capitalist uses his income for consumption, Cc;t, investment in capital,
Ic;t, and investment in government bonds, Dc;t. He also receives average
(per agent) transfers from the government, Gt (= Gt=N). Thus, his budget
constraint is:
Cc;t + Ic;t +Dc;t =
 
1   k  rktKc;t + rbtBc;t+
+
 
1   kft +  1  hwthc;t +Gt   'bcB2c;t   'kcK2c;t (3)
while the evolution of the stock of capital and government bonds, respectively,
are given by:
Kc;t+1 = (1  )Kc;t + Ic;t (4)
Bc;t+1 = Bc;t +Dc;t (5)
where 0 <  < 1 is a depreciation rate and Kc;0; Bc;0 > 0 are given.
2.4 Budget constraints of skilled workers
The problem of the skilled worker is similar to the capitalists, in that he
provides skilled labour to the factor market, invests the share of his income
he does not consume in capital and government bonds, earns interest rate
income on his nancial stock and pays the same tax rates as the capitalist
for these economic activities.
The skilled worker di¤ers, however, in that he pays potentially di¤erent
transaction costs, so that the capital market imperfections a¤ect him to a
greater extent.11 In particular, we assume that rm ownership gives an in-
sider advantage in nancial transactions to the capitalist (due, for instance, to
past experience, socioeconomic background, networks, etc.) and thus the size
of the transaction costs is lower for the capitalist. The idea that capital mar-
ket imperfections can explain heterogeneity has been extensively examined
in the income inequality literature (see e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Ben-
abou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998)). Most of these models assume,
for simplicity, that the intermediation cost is either innite for some agents
(and thus these agents are e¤ectively excluded from the nancial market) or
zero. In this paper, we examine the case of non-zero, nite intermediation
costs for both capitalists and skilled workers where 'bc < '
b
s, '
k
c < '
k
s . We
10Transaction costs also helps to di¤erentiate the Euler conditions for bonds and capital
in the steady-state, thus allowing for a unique solution.
11The skilled worker also di¤ers from the capitalist in that he does not appropriate the
prots of the rm. Given that, in this model, these prots are zero, in equilibrium, this
di¤erence is of course trivial.
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di¤erentiate the skilled worker and capitalist even further by assuming that
the former has lower initial holdings of capital and government bonds, i.e.
Ks;0 < Kc;0, Bs;0 < Bc;0:12
Accordingly, the budget constraints and the evolution equations for cap-
ital and government bonds for the sth skilled worker are:
Cs;t + Is;t +Ds;t =
 
1   k  rktKs;t + rbtBs;t+
+
 
1  hwths;t +Gt   'bsB2s;t   'ksK2s;t (6)
Is;t = Ks;t+1   (1  )Ks;t (7)
Ds;t = Bs;t+1  Bs;t: (8)
2.5 Budget constraint of unskilled workers
Unskilled workers di¤er from capitalists and skilled workers in two important
respects. First, they start with zero initial holdings of assets and capital mar-
ket imperfections result in them being excluded from the nancial markets
as in the models of Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998). In the
context of the formulation used above, this implies an innite intermediation
cost.13 Second, we assume that exclusion from capital markets does not al-
low them to acquire the skills to provide skilled labour services, so that their
labour e¤ort di¤ers, in nature, from the labour e¤ort of the other two types
of agents. Evidence from the UK, introduced later, suggests that skill acqui-
sition, in the form of University education, is indeed related to socioeconomic
income group.
Thus, the budget constraint of the uth unskilled worker is:
Cu;t = (1  u)wu;thu;t +Gt (9)
where 0  u < 1 is the tax rate on unskilled labour, hu;t is the labour supply
and Cu;t is the consumption.
2.6 Utility function of agents
Each type of household i = c; s; u maximises:
E0
1P
t=0
tu (Ci;t; hi;t) (10)
12For the policy experiments that we conduct, the initial conditions for each agent will
e¤ectively correspond to the steady-state of the pre-reform economy.
13See e.g. Aghion et al. (1999) for a microeconomic rationalisation of credit constraints
that do not allow agents to participate in asset markets.
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subject to the relevant budget constraints given above; where E0 is the con-
ditional expectations operator.
We use the instantaneous utility function:
ui;t = (Ci;t; hj;t) =

(Ci;t)
 (1  hi;t)1 
1 
1   (11)
where 0 < ; 1    < 0 are the weights attached to each argument of the
utility function and  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
2.7 Government budget constraint
Following the literature on tax reforms (see e.g. Lucas (1990), Cooley and
Hansen (1992), Giannitsarou (2006) and Garcia-Milà et al. (2010)), we do
not model government spending.14 Instead, government expenditure takes
the form of transfers to the private agents, Gt. To nance these, it taxes
income from labour and nancial assets and issues government bonds, Bt.
The budget constraint of the government is thus given by:
Gt +
 
1 + rbt

Bt = Bt+1 +N
c[ k
 
rktKc;t + r
b
tBc;t

+ hwthc;t]+
+N s[ k
 
rktKs;t + r
b
tBs;t

+ hwths;t] +N
u[uwu;thu;t]. (12)
2.8 Market-clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for the capital, bond, skilled and unskilled
labour and product markets respectively are:
N fKft = N
cKc;t +N
sKs;t (13)
Bt = N
cBc;t +N
sBs;t (14)
N fhft = N
chc;t +N
shs;t (15)
N fhfu;t = N
uhu;t (16)
N fY ft = N
cCc;t +N
sCs;t +N
uCu;t +N
c [Kc;t+1   (1  )Kc;t] + (17)
+N s [Ks;t+1   (1  )Ks;t] +N c
 
'bcB
2
c;t + '
k
cK
2
c;t

+N s
 
'bsB
2
s;t + '
k
sK
2
s;t

,
where (17) gives the aggregate resource constraint of the economy.
14To address distributional e¤ects of spending reforms, the possible benets of public
spending for di¤erent socioeconomic groups would need to be added to our model. More-
over, the potential distorting or crowding-out e¤ects of public spending would also need
to be more realistically incorporated to capture the e¤ects of increased spending on the
interest rate over and above changes to the marginal product of capital.
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2.9 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) is dened when (i) house-
holds and rms optimize, taking prices and policy as given; (ii) all constraints
are satised; and (iii) all markets clear. The optimality conditions for the
heterogenous households include four from the capitalist and four from the
skilled worker and two from the unskilled worker. In particular, each repre-
sentative capitalist and skilled worker chooses fCc;t; hc;t; Kc;t+1; Bc;t+1g1t=0 to
maximise discounted lifetime utility subject to (3  5) and fCs;t; hs;t; Ks;t+1;
Bs;t+1g1t=0 subject to (6  8), respectively. Whereas the representative un-
skilled worker chooses fCu;t; hu;tg1t=0 subject to (9). Finally, each represen-
tative rm chooses
n
Kft ; h
f
u;t; h
f
t
o1
t=0
to maximises prots subject to the
technology constraint (1). In addition to these thirteen rst-order condi-
tions, the DCE also includes the production function (1), two of the three
budget constraints from the households problems, the government bud-
get constraint (12), the market clearing conditions (13)-(16) and the ag-
gregate resource constraint (17). We substitute out the Lagrangian mul-
tipliers and output, using the appropriate rst-order conditions and the
production function, respectively, and use the market clearing conditions
(13)-(16) to substitute out Kft ; h
f
u;t; h
f
t and Bt. We can then summarise the
DCE by a system of fourteen equations in the paths of the following vari-
ables: (Cc;t; Cs;t; Cu;t; hc;t; hs;t; hu;t; wt; wu;t; Kc;t+1; Ks;t+1; Bc;t+1; Bs;t+1; rkt ; r
b
t )
given the exogenously set stationary AR processes for technology and s-
cal policy instruments which are discussed below.15 We dene the rele-
vant aggregate, economy-wide quantities using a capital letter Xt, for Xt =
fCt; It; Kt; Bt; Ytg.
2.10 The motion of productivity and scal policy in-
struments
2.10.1 Total factor productivity
Following the literature, we assume that the stochastic process determining
At is an exponential rst-order Markov process:
At = A
(1 a)
0 A
a
t 1e
"t (18)
where A0 > 0 is a constant, 0 < a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and
"t  iid(0; 2) are random shocks to productivity.
15To save space we have not reported the 14-equation DCE system here but it will be
provided on request.
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2.10.2 Policy instruments
Given that we wish to analyse the welfare implications of permanent tax
regime changes, all tax rates are treated as exogenous constants, 0   k; h; u
< 1. In particular, in the policy reforms that we will examine, the economy
will start from the steady-state and will be subjected to an exogenous, per-
manent change in one or more tax instruments, holding the other policy in-
struments, including G, constant at the pre-reform steady-state values. We
examine economic outcomes and welfare in the new steady and during the
transition period to the new steady-state. While we do not analyse the wel-
fare implications of changes in government spending, the calibrated value of
G
Y
is important in helping to obtain the current steady-state debt-to-output
ratio for the UK.
3 Calibration and steady-state
In Table 1 below, we next calibrate the structural parameters of the model so
that its steady-state solution reported in Table 2 reects the main empirical
characteristics of the UK economy. The calibration also provides empirical
justication for the key modelling decisions made above.
3.1 Distinguishing agent types
3.1.1 Population shares
We rst wish to map out agent heterogeneity and thus distinguish the three
types of households by their di¤ering shares in the population, ni. According
to the Family Resources Survey in 2008-2009, 28% of households do not have
any savings, 53% have savings up to £ 20,000 and 19% have savings above
£ 20,000.16 In light of this, since we assume that unskilled workers do not
have savings, we set nu equal to 30%. At the other end of the distribution,
since we model capitalists as the income group with the highest share of
savings and assets, we set nc to 20% implying that ns is 50%. Other data
providing an additional dimension by which unskilled workers di¤er from
skilled workers and capitalists is that the former group o¤ers a labour input
that is lacking in skills. According to the Labour Force Survey, O¢ ce for
National Statistics17, in 2003, 28% of the working population was employed
in semi-routine and routine occupations, whereas the remaining share worked
16The Survey is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions (see Table 4.9 for
the information reported here).
17See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7665.xls.
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in supervisory, technical, professional and managerial occupations, which
require an increasingly higher skilled labour input. Moreover, according to
data from the Department for Education and Skills on the participation
rates in higher education for di¤erent income groups, the participation ratio
was about three times higher in the 1990s for the three highest, relative to
the three lowest groups.18 Thus, there appears to be adequate support for
associating skill with income group.
Table 1: Parameter Values
parameter value denition
0 <  < 1 0.590 productivity of composite input
0 <  < 1 0.400 capital weight in composite input share
0    1 0.100 depreciation rate on private capital
'kc ; '
b
c > 0 0.001 transaction costs, capitalists
'ks ; '
b
s > 0 0.005 transaction costs, skilled workers
0 <  < 1 0.976 rate of time preference
0 <  < 1 0.347 consumption weight in utility
 > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
0 < nc < 1 0.200 population share of capitalists
0 < ns < 1 0.500 population share of skilled workers
0 < G=Y < 1 0.330 public spending share of output
0 < h < 1 0.300 labour tax rate skilled
0 <  k < 1 0.442 capital tax rate
0 < u < 1 0.200 labour tax rate unskilled
0 < a < 1 0.920 AR(1) parameter productivity
a > 0 0.030 std. dev. of productivity innovations
3.1.2 Asset holdings
We next turn to heterogeneity in asset holdings and returns to labour which
governs the choice of the relevant production parameters. In particular,
following e.g. Stokey (1996), we set the productivity of the composite input
in the production function,  to 0:59 and , the weight of capital in the
composite input share to 0:4. This implies that, at the steady-state, the
capital to skilled labour elasticity of substitution is 0:67, the elasticity of
capital with respect to unskilled labour is 0:88 and the elasticity of skilled
to unskilled labour is 1:30. These elasticities are well within the range of
estimated elasticities of substitution in the literature (see e.g. Krusell et
al. (2000) for a review of such studies). In turn, these parameters and
the implied elasticities lead to a steady-state skill premium, dened as log
18See www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7308.xls.
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di¤erences between the wage rates for skilled and unskilled labour, of 24%.
Also note that the ratio of the wage rates for skilled and unskilled labour is
1:28. These values are again broadly consistent with estimates for both the
UK and the USA. For the UK, Walker and Zhu (2008) estimate a college
premium (in log di¤erences) of about 18% for males and 28% for females.
Machin (1996) computes the ratio of wages between non-manual and manual
jobs in manufacturing that ranges between 1:3 and 1:5, from 1970 to 1990.
For the USA, Krusell et al. (2000) report a college premium, in terms of
wage ratios, of about 1:18 in 1990.
3.1.3 Savings
Heterogeneity in savings is controlled for, as explained in the previous section,
by the parameters that govern transaction costs in the nancial markets. In
particular, following the models in e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou
(1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998), we set these costs to innity for the
unskilled workers, which implies that these agents do not have any savings.
As said above, about 28% of the UK households do not save. Regarding the
households with positive savings, data from the Family Resources Survey
of 2008-2009 suggest that households in the highest saving bracket have ve
times higher savings than the other savers, on average. In terms of our model,
this di¤erence is applied to the representative capitalist and skilled worker
by setting the transaction costs for the latter to be ve times greater than
the former. For simplicity, we set this cost in capital asset markets to be
the same in the bond market. We chose the level of the transaction costs
parameter, so that in combination with a usual annual depreciation rate, ,
of 10%, the total ratio of capital to GDP in the steady-state is about 2, which
again coheres with UK data.
3.1.4 E¤ective tax rates
E¤ective average tax rates for capital and labour income are constructed by
following the approach in Conesa et al. (2007).19 We use data from the
National Accounts and the Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation
databases (available from OECD.Stat), to obtain the same series as in Conesa
et al. (2007) for 1970-2005.20 The average capital tax rate over the time
period is  k = 0:442, while the average labour income rate is 0:27. Using
19See their Appendix B for more details.
20As an alternative, we have also used the ECFIN e¤ective average tax rates (see
Martinez-Mongay (2000)). Both approaches give similar long-run averages of labour tax
rates, while the ECFIN capital tax rate is higher.
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data from Social Trends 38, O¢ ce for National Statistics, we are able to
approximate the progressivity of the UK income tax system at about 1:6.21 A
ratio of h=u = 1:6, together with the requirement that the weighted average
of the two tax rates equal the e¤ective labour income tax rate, would imply
that h = 0:304 and u = 0:19. However, the progressivity of income taxation
probably overestimates the progressivity of labour income taxation, which is
our interest here. This is because, in light of the data discussed, we would
expect the higher income brackets to have more capital income compared
to lower income brackets. On the other hand, the lower the progressivity
ratio, the higher the implied value of u. We thus use a progressivity ratio
of h=u = 1:5 for the calibration, which guarantees that u is equal to the
base income tax rate. Accordingly, we approximate the lower tax rate, u,
at 20%, and the higher labour income tax rate, h at 30%.
3.2 Parameters common to all agents
We next approximate the rate of time preference, , so that 1= is equal to 1
plus the ex-post real interest rate, where we use real interest rate data from
OECD Main Economic Indicators, from 1970-2005. This gives a value 0:976
for . Following Kydland (1995), we set , the weight given to consumption
relative to leisure in the utility function, equal to the average value of work
versus leisure time, which is obtained using data on hours worked from the
OECD Economic Outlook database, from 1970-2005.22 We also use a com-
mon value from the literature for the intertemporal elasticity of consumption,
1= = 0:5 or  = 2.
Given that we will evaluate policies that reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio
below, we calibrate the share of government spending in GDP,G=Y , to obtain
a B=Y ratio of 70% based on o¢ cial forecasts for 2011-2013 (see e.g. the Pre-
Budget Forecast, June 2010, O¢ ce for Budget Responsibility)23. Finally, the
AR(1) relation for the productivity process in (18) is estimated using TFP
data from the O¢ ce for National Statistics, 1970-2005. The estimated values
for a is 0:92 and is signicant at less than the 1% level of signicance. The
standard deviation, a, is 0:03.
21This is obtained by calculating the average income tax rate that applies approximately
to the lower 30% and the upper 70% of the tax payers. We then add the national insurance
contribution rate of 11% and calculate the ratio of these two e¤ective average tax rates.
22To obtain this we divide total hours worked by total hours available for work or leisure,
following Ho and Jorgenson (2001). They assume that there are 14 hours available for work
or leisure per day with the remaining 10 hours accounted for by physiological needs.
23See http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk.
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3.3 Steady-state
The steady-state solution of the model in this, pre-reform, high debt equi-
librium, is given in Table 2 below in terms of the aggregate variables. In
particular, we see that the capitalists consume in total 17:6% of total income
(or about 22% of total consumption24), skilled workers consume in total
40:9% of total income (or around 51% of total consumption) and unskilled
workers consume in total 21:9% of total income (or approximately 27% of
total consumption). In addition, the capitalists in total have around 67% of
total savings and own about 67% of the capital and government bonds in the
economy. As said above, the ratio of savings, Ic=Is, and assets, Kc=Ks and
Bc=Bs, of the representative capitalist to the representative skilled worker,
are equal to ve. Note also that the net (after depreciation, tax and trans-
action costs) interest rates on capital and bonds, are given respectively by:
erk = rk(1   k)     2'kc  ncnc + ns

Kc   2'ks

ns
nc + ns

Ks (19)
erb = rb(1   k)  2'bc ncnc + ns

Bc   2'bs

ns
nc + ns

Bs (20)
and are equal in the steady-state.
It is also worth noting that the labour supply elasticities of this model are
more in line with microeconometric studies than in the standard aggregate
RBC models. In particular, the Frisch (or -constant) labour supply elastic-
ity (see e.g. Browning et. al., 1999) is 3:41 for capitalists, 0:43 for skilled
and 2:31 for unskilled workers. Microeconometric studies (see e.g. Browning
et. al. (1999) for a review) generally suggest that the Frisch labour supply
elasticity is less than one and the standard RBC model implies an elasticity
around four (see e.g. King and Rebelo, (1999)). The elasticities reported
here suggest that capitalists (skilled workers) are less (more) dependent on
labour income respectively.
24This is calculated as (N
cCc)=Y
C=Y = (N
c  Cc)=C. The same formula is used below for
similar quantities.
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Table 2: Steady-state (pre reform)
variable value variable value
NcCc
Y
0.176 N
cKc
Y
1.292
NsCs
Y
0.409 N
sKs
Y
0.646
NuCu
Y
0.219 K
Y
1.938
C
Y
0.804 N
cBc
Y
0.467
NcIc
Y
0.129 N
sBs
Y
0.233
NsIs
Y
0.065 B
Y
0.700
I
Y
0.194 erk 0.025
w 0.434 erb 0.025
wu 0.340 Uc -93.925
hc 0.165 Us -101.051
hs 0.224 Uu -105.267
hu 0.226 Ua -100.891
The skill premium, measured as the log di¤erences in the wage rates is
about 24% as noted earlier. In the steady-state, capitalists work considerably
less than skilled and unskilled workers, who work more or less the same time
(see the hi gures in Table 2). Also note that in the steady-state Cc =
0:1349; Cs = 0:1253 and Cu = 0:1120. Thus in terms of welfare, Ui, higher
consumption and lower work e¤ort make the capitalists better o¤, followed by
the skilled and unskilled workers respectively. The weighted average measure
of aggregate or Benthamite lifetime utility, Ua, is also reported in Table 2.25
4 Model Solution
To solve the model, we start by taking the rst-order Taylor series ex-
pansion of the DCE and exogenous process for productivity around their
respective steady-states. For any variable Xt, these values are denotedbXt = logXt  logX. We next re-express the model in matrix form as second-
order di¤erence equation system:
xt=M1Etxt+1 +M2xt 1 +M3zt
yt= N1xt +N2xt 1 +N3zt +N4Etxt+1
zt= zt 1 + ut:
(21)
25The lifetime utility of agent i in the steady-state is given by Ui =
(1 T )
1  ui, for
i = c; s; u, where ui is the welfare of i calculated at the steady state using (11) and
T = 1000.
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where xt =
h
B^c;t+1; K^c;t+1; B^s;t+1; K^s;t+1
i0
contains the endogenous state vari-
ables; yt =
h
C^c;t; C^s;t; C^u;t; h^c;t; h^s;t; h^u;t; r^
b
t ; r^
k
t ; w^t; w^u;t
i0
the endogenous con-
trol variables; and zt = [a^t+1] the exogenous state variables.26 The variousM
and N matrices contain convolutions of the structural parameters calibrated
in Table 1. Finally, since we only have one exogenous state variable,  = a
and ut = "t+1.
In what follows we use (21) to briey describe how we obtain both the
rational expectations (RE) and adaptive learning (AL) solutions of the log-
linearised model. Since these methods are well known, our purpose is merely
to set out notation and variable denitions which will be used in the results
and analysis below.
4.1 Rational expectations
Employing the undetermined coe¢ cients method, agents rst guess that the
equilibrium laws of motion for the state variables under RE have the following
linear form:
xt = xxt 1 + zzt (22)
where x and z are coe¢ cient matrices. Substituting for zt using the last
equation in (21) gives:
xt = xxt 1 + zzt 1 + z
 1ut (23)
where x = x and z = z. Leading (23) by one-period and taking
expectations of both sides yields:
Etxt+1 = xxt + zzt (24)
since z
 1Et [ut+1] = 0. Substituting (24) and (23) into the rst equation
of (21) gives:
xt =

(I M1x) 1M2

xt 1 +
+

(I M1x) 1 (M1z +M3)
  
zt 1 + ut

: (25)
Comparing (25) with (23) implies that the unique RE solution of the reduced-
form model is given by the two parameter matrices, hereafter denoted by x
and z, that satisfy the following two equations:
x = (I M1x) 1M2
z = (I M1x) 1 (M1z +M3): (26)
26For examples of others papers in the literature using this particular reduced form, see
Evans and Hokhaponja (2001), Kasa (2004), Giannitsarou (2006) and Carceles Poveda
and Giannitsarou (2008).
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Assuming x and z exist, the solution for the models state variables
under RE is:27
xt = xxt 1 + 
 1zzt: (27)
Substituting (27) and the expected value of its lead into the second equation
of (21) gives the RE solution for the models control variables:
yt =
h
N1x +N2 +N4
2
x
i
xt 1 +
+

N1
 1z +N3 +N4
 
z + x
 1z

zt: (28)
4.2 Adaptive learning
Under the AL hypothesis, it is also assumed that private agents can correctly
guess the form of the equilibrium policy functions of the state variables given
by (22). However, in contrast to the RE solution, it is assumed that they
do not know the time-invariant parameter values given by x and z, which
ultimately govern the dynamics of the economy.28 Therefore, they must rely
on past data and a recursive learning algorithm to estimate these parameters
to produce forecasts of the endogenous state variables for the next period.
As new data become available in each period, they revise their parameter
estimates so that their forecasting errors are corrected gradually.
More formally, agents expectations are assumed to follow a so-called
perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form:
Etxt+1= ~x;t 1xt + ~z;t 1zt (29)
where parameters ~x and ~z are the estimates of x and z coming from
a recursive least-squares regression and E denotes that expectations do not
follow the RE hypothesis.29
Following a similar procedure as under RE, we substitute (29) into the
rst equation of (21) to obtain:
xt= P1xt 1 +  1P2zt (30)
27The two solution matrices x and z, were obtained applying the method proposed
by Klein (2000).
28Adaptive learning has its foundations in the work of Marcet and Sargent (1989) and
Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
29Note, we follow the common assumption (see, e.g. Evans and Honkaphoja (2001) and
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007)) that at period t agents form expectations for
xt+1 using their estimates from the previous period, ~x;t 1 and ~z;t 1, which allows us
to avoid a problem of simultaneity in the learning process.
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where
P1= (I M1~x;t 1) 1M2
P2= (I M1~x;t 1) 1

M1~z;t 1 +M3

:
(31)
Equation (30) is referred to as the actual law of motion (ALM) since every
new observed value of xt depends on the deep parameters of the model econ-
omy but also on the agentsforecasts given by the PLM (29).
The actual laws of motion for the control variables under learning are
found by substituting (30) for xt and (29) for Etxt+1 in the second equation
of (21) giving:
yt =
h
N1P1 +N2 +N4~x;t 1P1
i
xt 1 +
+
h
N1
 1P2 +N3 +N4

~x;t 1
 1P2+~z;t 1
i
zt: (32)
4.2.1 Recursive least-squares learning
We next focus on how the estimates ~x and ~z in (29) are obtained. We
rst dene a vector wt containing the observed values of all the state vari-
ables (including the exogenous process) and another vector ~t = [~x;t; ~z;t]
0
containing the parameter estimates obtained in each period.30 In what fol-
lows, we will assume that all agents who form expectations, namely capi-
talists and skilled workers, follow a recursive least-squares (RLS) learning
algorithm. According to this algorithm (see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007)), in each period agents
estimate the parameter matrices ~t = [~x;t; ~z;t]
0 as they try to nd their
corresponding true values  = [x; z]
0 which come from the RE solution.
For this purpose they make use of all the available data up to that period in
a least-squares regression:
xt = ~
0
wt 1 + et (33)
to get a new estimate ~t, where et is the forecast error. According to the least-
squares method, ~t will be the coe¢ cient vector which minimizes
PT
t=1
e2t and
is given by:
~t =
 
TX
i=1
wi 1w
0
i 1
! 1 TX
i=1
wi 1x0i (34)
30Note that under our model setup we have wt = [B^c;t+1; K^c;t+1; B^s;t+1; K^s;t+1; a^t+1]0.
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The estimator above can be written in a recursive fashion for t = 1; 2; 3:::, as
follows:
~t= ~t 1+gtR
 1
t wt 1(xt   ~
0
t 1wt 1)
0
Rt= Rt 1+gt
 
wt 1w
0
t 1  Rt 1
 (35)
where Rt is a matrix with the second moments of the regressors included in
wt; (xt   ~0t 1wt 1) is the latest forecast error that will be used to correct
the current estimates; and gt = 1=t is the gain sequence implying that as t
increases, every new forecast error will have a lower relative importance.31
4.2.2 Stability and convergence
An important issue is whether the learning algorithm will converge to the RE
solution. We rst consider the so-called expectational stability or E-stability
of the model under AL (see the Appendix for further details). Intuitively, the
RE solution  = [x; z]
0 will be E-stable under learning if small deviations
from it return to  = [x; z]
0 under the chosen learning rule. For our
model, the E-stability condition is met for the base calibration and all policy
experiments considered below.
A second condition for convergence is the stationarity of the RE solution.
This requires that the eigenvalues of x have real parts less than one, ensuring
that the part of the RE solution associated with the lags of the state variables
do not have an explosive path. The stationarity condition is also met for the
base calibration and all policy experiments considered below.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that if the E-stability and stationarity
conditions are satised, the RLS algorithm converges locally to x and z
and thus the model at hand is learnable. Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) show
that the above conditions also guarantee local convergence in models with
structural heterogeneity and heterogeneous initial beliefs. However, these
two conditions cannot ensure global convergence of the learning algorithm to
the RE solution. As we shall see below, for two of our experiments, where we
initialise learning from a point that is far from the RE solution, the learning
algorithm breaks down as it implies that the adaptive learners make such big
mistakes that a well dened solution to the problem cannot be obtained. In
other words, the RE solution is not learnable in these cases.
31We make use of Matlab functions made available by Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou
(2007) to solve the model using AL.
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5 Policy analysis
5.1 La¤er curves in tax revenue and debt
Our aim is to evaluate the e¤ects of tax reforms that are consistent with
a particular long-run debt-to-output target, both at the aggregate level but
also for each heterogeneous group of agents in the population. To this end, we
rst calculate the change in a tax rate (or a combination of tax rates) required
to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to a desired level at the steady-state, leaving
all the other tax rates and parameters in the model constant. In particular,
we start from the current (or pre-reform) steady-state in the economy and
calculate the new (or post-reform) steady-state, where the debt-to-GDP ratio
is given at the 60% target and a tax rate (or a combination of tax rates) is
chosen to satisfy the government budget constraint.
The relationship between the tax revenue from a particular tax base and
the associated tax rate is, in general, given by a La¤er curve (see e.g. Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (1997) for a discussion of La¤er curves in tax revenue in
a DGE context). Thus, in our model, an increase (decrease) in a tax rate
can lead to either increases (decreases) or decreases (increases) in the tax
revenue collected from this tax base, depending on whether the economy
is on the upward or downward slopping part of the curve, respectively. In
a heterogenous agent context, the complementarity/substitutability of the
factors in the production function implies that a tax rate change will have
spillover e¤ects to the tax revenue collected from the other tax bases. For
instance, an increase in the capital tax rate will decrease the capital supply,
but will tend to increase the supply of unskilled labour, which can substitute
for capital in production. Thus, the tax revenue collected from the tax base
of unskilled labour income is likely to increase after an increase in the capital
tax. Hence, these spillover e¤ects, due to the form of technology employed,
imply that the relationship between total tax revenue and the tax rates can
be di¤erent from the relationship between tax revenue from a particular tax
base and the tax rate. In particular, the economy can be on one side of the
La¤er curve of tax revenue from a particular tax base but on either side the
total revenue La¤er curve.
A lower level of debt in the steady-state implies that there will also be a
reduction in interest payments on debt and thus in total government spend-
ing, assuming, as we do here, that the remaining components of government
spending do not change. Hence, tax reforms consistent with reducing steady-
state debt will need to generate a lower level of total tax revenue.32 As long
32This is di¤erent from the analysis in e.g. Lucas (1990), Angelopoulos et al. (2008)
and Garcia-Mila et al. (2010), where the tax reforms considered, in the form of decreasing
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as a La¤er curve exists in tax revenue with respect to the tax rates, these tax
changes can take the form of either decreases or increases in the tax rates
since this relationship suggests that a particular tax revenue target can be
achieved by two tax rates. We would then expect that there should be a Laf-
fer curve characterising the relationship between debt and debt-to-GDP with
respect to the tax rates. We plot and discuss these relationships below.33
The above discussion implies that, consistent with the analysis in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (1997), for a given level of debt, when a tax rate is the
variable that is chosen to satisfy the government budget constraint, it can
have two long-run solutions.34 A critical condition for this is that there
is a La¤er curve with respect to total tax revenue. As will be discussed
below, the role of the complementarity/substitutability in the capital and
labour supply policies of the heterogeneous agents is important in obtaining
this La¤er curve and thus in making both long-run solutions empirically
plausible. In addition, this complementarity/substitutability implies that the
optimal reactions to tax reforms will have distributional e¤ects that might
di¤er between the two long-run solutions, across the di¤erent policy reforms.
To rank order these two equilibria at both the aggregate level and for each
individual type of agent, across di¤erent tax reforms we undertake a welfare
analysis.
5.2 Alternative tax regimes
Our analysis concentrates on examining tax policies to reduce the debt-to-
GDP ratio to the EU target of 60%.35 Therefore, starting from the current
the capital tax, leave the total tax revenue unchanged. This is achieved in these models
by an increase in the labour tax. Giannitsarou (2006), on the other hand, considers
the case where the capital tax rate is decreased, while the labour tax rate is kept xed
and government spending is endogenously chosen to close the model in the post-reform
economy.
33Note that in a general equilibrium framework, for a given level of spending other than
interest payments, a higher level of debt can only be sustained, in the steady-state, by
higher tax revenues. This is because the interest payments on the debt, which are part of
government expenditure, increase with the level of debt. Thus, there should be a positive
relationship in the long-run between debt and tax revenue, for a given level of government
spending other than interest payments.
34Note that Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (1997), also discuss the parameter range under
which some of these equilibria can be indeterminate. For our model and the calibrated
parameters for the UK, all solutions obtained below are saddle-path stable.
35Note that our results are qualitatively robust to tax reforms to achieve lower debt
targets. Quantitatively, the welfare e¤ects are naturally bigger under such targets because
the required changes in the tax rates are also bigger. Moreover, the costs associated with
AL are also larger in this case.
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state of the economy summarised in Table 2, in the experiments that follow,
the government increases or decreases the various tax rates at its disposal
with the aim of reducing the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio. Recall that
in the baseline pre-reform economy, u = 0:2; h = 0:3; and  k = 0:442.
Given that we seek to evaluate the distributional e¤ects of tax reforms to
meet a particular debt target and not the optimal size of the government
or government debt, we take this debt target as given. Hence, we do not
evaluate the potential welfare benets from reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio,
in the form of, for instance, lowering the cost of borrowing for the government
and reassuring nancial markets that there is no risk of default.36
We examine four di¤erent tax reforms to meet the debt target. First,
the scenario where the government, ceteris paribus, increases/decreases the
tax rate on skilled labour, h, implying that the progressivity of labour in-
come taxation has risen/fallen. We then examine the case where the gov-
ernment increases/decreases the e¤ective average labour tax rate, i.e. it in-
creases/decreases h and u proportionately, so that the progressivity in the
labour income taxation remains unchanged. We do not examine increases in
u only, as this would require a reversal of the tax system from progressive
to regressive, which we consider not to be socio-politically feasible. Next,
we evaluate the distributional e¤ects of increases/decreases in the capital in-
come tax rate,  k, holding all other rates constant and nally, the e¤ects of
increasing/decreases all tax rates proportionately.
For each tax regime considered, we rst nd the steady-state tax rate(s)
required to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60%, by working as described
in the previous sub-section. We also discuss the La¤er curves in tax revenue
and debt associated with each tax change in the long-run. We then assume
that the economy is in the current, pre-reform steady-state when the govern-
ment implements the tax reform as a permanent change in a tax rate (or a
combination of tax rates) and simulate the response of the model economy,
as described in Section 2, to this change until it reaches the new steady-
state. Hence, the only change in policy in the post-reform economy is the
higher/lower tax rate(s).
5.2.1 Welfare comparisons
In each case, we present the conditional welfare costs or benets for each
agent and the aggregate economy for two di¤erent assumptions regarding
expectations. First, we evaluate the lifetime welfare of all agents over time,
36It would, of course, be very interesting to examine whether the benets from reducing
the debt-to-GDP ratio in this fashion can be distributed di¤erentially in the population,
but this is outside the scope of our analysis.
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as they converge to the post-reform steady-state starting from the current
economy, assuming rational expectations. Then, we evaluate welfare over this
transition path, assuming that agents have fully learned the pre-reform ratio-
nal expectations solution and form expectations in the post-reform economy
under bounded rationality. In particular, we assume that the agents learn the
coe¢ cients of their reduced form policy functions in the post-reform economy
by using the adaptive learning algorithm described above.
5.2.2 Initial conditions for learning
For the second case above involving bounded rationality, we examine two
scenarios for the initial conditions. In the rst, which serves to contextualise
our results relative to the literature, we follow e.g. Giannitsarou (2006) and
Evans et. al. (2009) and assume that the agents start learning using the
reduced form coe¢ cients that correspond to the pre-reform economy. This
would represent the case where the tax change is not anticipated. In the
second, we assume that there is heterogeneity in the initial conditions used
for learning.
In particular, we assume that the skilled workers "guess" that the co-
e¢ cients remain the same and thus use the coe¢ cients that correspond to
the pre-reform economy in their policy functions for the initial period. In
contrast, we assume that the capitalists are able to predict the post-reform
RE steady-state and their optimal reduced form coe¢ cients for their policy
functions in this equilibrium, so that their "guess" for their initial coe¢ -
cients correspond to the post-reform RE solution. Therefore, in the initial
period the capitalists make their choices as if they were in the post-reform
RE economy, while the skilled workers make their choices as if they were
in the pre-reform RE economy. This heterogeneity in beliefs implies that
the initial guesses for both agents are incorrect, as the actual economy, as
determined by the interaction of their choices, is neither in the pre- nor in
the post-reform RE equilibrium. Given the gap between the expected and
actual outcomes, both agents use thereafter recursive least-squares to learn
the coe¢ cients.
More formally, to represent the importance of initial beliefs for the solu-
tion of the model, dene pre =

x;pre; z;pre
0
and post =

x;post; z;post
0
as the RE solution matrices for the pre-reform and post-reform economies,
respectively, and ~0 =
h
~x;0; ~z;0
i0
as the matrix containing the starting val-
ues of the learning algorithm. To obtain the rational expectations solution,
we assume that:
~0 =

x;post; z;post
0
(36)
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where R0 is the covariance matrix associated with the values of the en-
dogenous state variables as predicted by their corresponding policy functions
under the post-reform RE solution post.
37
For the case of homogeneous learning, we assume, as in Giannitsarou
(2006) that:
~0 =

x;pre; z;pre
0
(37)
where the covariance matrix R0 is computed as described above, using (37)
instead of (36).
For the case of heterogeneous learning, let 
c
x;post and 
c
z;post be a (4 2)
and (1  2) sub-matrices of x;post and z;post, respectively, containing the
two columns of x;post and z;post that correspond to the policy functions
of the capitalists. Similarly, let 
s
x;pre and 
s
z;pre be a (4  2) and (1  2)
sub-matrices of x;pre and z;pre, respectively, containing the two columns
of x;pre and z;pre that correspond to the policy functions of the skilled
workers. Hence, ~0 is constructed as:
~0 =
" 

c
x;post

42


s
x;pre

42

c
z;post

12


s
z;pre

12
#
(38)
while, for consistency, R0 is now computed as above but using (38) instead.
Note that for all the post-reform scenarios considered, ~0 always satis-
es the stationarity condition that the real parts of all the eigenvalues of
~x;0 must lie inside the unit circle, while R0 is always an invertible matrix.
These two conditions ensure the algorithm is adequately initialised, see, e.g.
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007).
5.2.3 Measuring conditional welfare
We calculate conditional welfare or discounted lifetime utility using equation
(10) and a time horizon of 1000 periods, by conditioning on the initial guesses
for the cases under learning. When the economy is at the steady-state, this is
equivalent to welfare reported in Table 2. To calculate the welfare losses for
all agents between the post- and pre-reform economy, we follow e.g. Lucas
37To obtain R0 we make use of a numerical approximation involving the following steps:
(i) simulate a series of N(0; a) random shocks for the exogenous state variable at, for
Tnum = 100; 000 periods; (ii) using (i), simulate the values for the endogenous state
variables as predicted by their corresponding policy functions under the post reform RE
solution (post) for Tnum; (iii) construct w(5Tnum) including the time series of the simu-
lated values for the ve states (Bc;t; Kc;t; Bs;t; Ks;t; at); and (iv) compute the covariance
matrix in a recursive fashion according to the second equation of (35), where the starting
values R0 and w0 are given by two zero matrices.
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(1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992), Giannitsarou (2006) and Malley et al.
(2009) by computing the percentage extra consumption that an individual
would require so as to be equally well o¤ between the two regimes. This is
dened as i;j
i;j =
 
Uposti;j
Uprei;ss
! 1
(1 ) 1
(39)
for each agent i = c; s; u; a and each case j = re; al, where ss denotes welfare
calculated in the steady-state, re welfare under the rational expectations
solution and al, welfare under adaptive heterogeneous learning. For all the
cases below, in the case of homogeneous learning, the welfare e¤ects of tax
reforms for all agents are e¤ectively the same as under the RE solution as
in Giannitsarou (2006).38 Hence, to save on space, we do not discuss results
from this solution further. To quantify the importance of bounded rationality
with heterogeneous initial beliefs for welfare, we also calculate the cost of the
heterogeneous learning, compared to the rational expectations solution. This
is dened as  i;k
 i =
 
Uposti;re
Uposti;al
! 1
(1 ) 1
(40)
where i = c; s; u; a.
In Tables 3 - 6 below we report the welfare losses or gains for all agents
under the di¤erent scenarios and policy regimes, calculated using the formu-
las above. In Figures 1 - 4, we plot the tax revenue and debt La¤er curves, the
pre-reform steady-state in percent deviations from the post-reform steady-
state and the transition paths of the four state variables as well as con-
sumption and labour hours for each agent, under rational expectations and
learning. Each Figure corresponds to a particular tax reform case. The paths
of consumption and hours are important as these will ultimately determine
welfare for each agent.
5.3 La¤er curves in h
The La¤er curves associated with changes in h are shown in Figure 1a. These
show the tax revenue collected and debt relative to the current steady-state,
which is normalised to 100 for ease of presentation. For B=Y , we plot debt
as a share of GDP. The pre-reform steady-state is also given on each La¤er
38Note it is only when the tax reform was accompanied by a positive or negative shock
to TFP that the rational expectations and learning transition paths more substantially
di¤ered in Giannitsarou (2006).
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curve in Figure 1a. We present those for a range of labour income tax rates
that are consistent with a well-dened solution to the model.
As can be seen from the debt-to-GDP La¤er curve (lower right panel), the
B=Y target of 60% can be achieved by either increasing h to 47:7%, or by
decreasing it to 27:1% from its pre-reform rate of 30%. The required increase
in h is large and essentially implies increasing the e¤ective average tax rate
for the upper 70% of the income distribution to the e¤ective income tax that
currently applies to highest income brackets (i.e. those with annual incomes
above £ 200,000), when the National Insurance contributions are accounted
for as well (see the average tax rates per income group in Social Trends 38,
O¢ ce for National Statistics). This implies an increase in the progressivity
of the e¤ective labour income tax system to 2:39, from less than 1:6 as it
currently stands. In contrast, the required decreases in h are small, and
would result in decreasing the labour income progressivity ratio to 1:36.
[Figure 1a about here]
The La¤er curve for labour income from skilled labour in Figure 1a (up-
per left panel) indicates that the economy is always on the upward slopping
part of this curve, at least for values of h that give a well-dened solution,
so that increases (decreases) in h increase (decrease) tax revenue. The pre-
and post-reform steady-states for the increase in h are shown in Figure 1b.
As can be seen, the resulting fall in skilled labour supply causes a decrease
in the supply of capital and unskilled labour, because of the complementari-
ties in production. Given that the tax rates on capital and unskilled labour
have not changed, the tax revenue collected from these two sources decreases,
which is depicted in Figure 1a (upper right and upper middle panels respec-
tively). These imply that the increases in total revenue when h increases are
smaller, as shown in the total revenue La¤er curve in Figure 1a (lower left
panel), so that, for instance, an increase in h from 0:3 to 0:4 increases tax
revenue from skilled labour by about 20%, while leaving total tax revenue
practically unchanged. Therefore, the complementarity between capital and
labour implies that there is a La¤er curve between total tax revenue and h,
the peak of which is obtained for a value of h about 35% despite that fact
that we only obtained the upward slopping part of the skilled labour tax
revenue La¤er curve.
[Figure 1b about here]
Of course, the e¤ects on tax revenue are reversed for decreases in h.
As can be seen when comparing the pre- and post-reform steady-states for
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falls in h in Figure 1c, when h (and thus also tax revenue from skilled
labour) decreases, there is an increase in skilled labour supply, which causes
an increase in the supply of capital and unskilled labour, due to the comple-
mentarities in production. Given that the tax rates on capital and unskilled
labour have not changed, the tax revenue collected from these two sources
increases so that the total tax revenue falls by less. For instance, when h
decreases from 0:3 to 0:2, tax revenue from skilled labour falls by about 40%,
while total tax revenue falls by approximately 10%.
[Figure 1c about here]
It is interesting to note that although the complementarity between cap-
ital and labour also exists in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
within a representative agent framework, the quantitative importance of the
complementarities between the three di¤erent factor inputs is di¤erent in
the heterogeneous agents setup, in light of the role of unskilled labour. Given
that, as discussed in the calibration section, the elasticities of substitution
between all three factor inputs considered here are well within those found in
micro-econometric studies, the quantitative implications of these complemen-
tarities is not without empirical foundation. As said above, it is essentially
because of these complementarities that we obtain the La¤er curve in total
tax revenue, which, in turn, implies that there will be a La¤er curve with
respect to debt and thus two long-run solutions for reducing the debt by
changing h.
5.3.1 Transition dynamics and welfare e¤ects
In Figure 1b we plot the dynamic transition from pre- to the post-reform
steady-state for an increase in h and in Figure 1c for a fall in h. In Table
3 we calculate the welfare losses and gains for all agents in both cases.
The rst thing to note in Figure 1b is that the post-reform economy
implies less consumption and less work time, for all agents, as a result of
higher taxation. An increase in h hurts the capitalist and the skilled worker
directly, but indirectly it also negatively a¤ects the unskilled worker. This
happens because skilled labour complements unskilled, so that a decline in
the former reduces the productivity of the latter. This trade-o¤ implies a fall
in welfare for all agents in the post-reform economy, as can seen by the re
measure in the rst column of Table 3. Given that the e¤ects on the capitalist
and the skilled worker are direct, they are hurt more by this change and hence
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su¤er very big losses in welfare.
Table 3: Welfare costs/gains of reducing B=Y to 0:6
h = 0:477 h = 0:271
re al  re al 
Capitalist -0.0802 -0.0873 0.0078 0.0034 0.0052 -0.0018
Skilled -0.1164 -0.1200 0.0040 0.0173 0.0183 -0.0010
Unskilled -0.0166 -0.0148 -0.0019 0.0024 0.0019 5.1e-04
Aggregate -0.0798 -0.0825 0.0029 0.0100 0.0107 -7.0e-04
Adaptive learning increases the welfare costs, if we assume that capitalists
and skilled workers form di¤erent initial beliefs about the economy and their
policy functions. As can be seen in Figure 1b, the paths under heterogeneous
learning deviate substantially and actually over- and under-shoot the rational
expectations solution, as the agents learn and update their forecasts over
time. In particular, the capitalist and the skilled worker overshoot in their
decrease in consumption and undershoot the reduction in labour hours for
long time periods. Both movements tend to reduce their welfare, compared to
rational expectations. The additional losses, as reported in Table 3, are not
trivial and amount to 0:78% of consumption for the capitalist and 0:4% for
the skilled worker. The unskilled workers, forming no expectations, are not
a¤ected as much by learning. They are actually better o¤ under learning, as
their consumption is not reduced by as much, which more than compensates
for the smaller increase in leisure time.
The results are reversed when h is decreased. As discussed above, the
increase in the labour supply of skilled labour crowds-in capital and unskilled
labour, increasing the tax revenue collected and also consumption for all
agents, as can be seen in Figure 1c. The trade-o¤ is now in favour of all
agents, who are now better o¤ in the post-reform economy, as can be seen
in Table 3. Hence, all agents in the economy would support a decrease in
h relative to the current steady-state. In addition, adaptive learning with
heterogeneous initial beliefs implies, in fact, small welfare benets for the
agents. Under heterogeneous learning, they overshoot their adjustment to
the post-reform steady-state and hence they reap more quickly the benets
associated with the post-reform economy.
5.4 La¤er curves in u and h
When both labour income tax rates are increased proportionately, they both
need to increase signicantly, to 0:365 for u and 0:548 for h. On the
contrary, small decreases, u = 0:189 and h = 0:283 would su¢ ce to reduce
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B=Y to 0:6. We plot the La¤er curves for this case in Figure 2a, working as
in Figure 1a. Note that we plot tax revenue from skilled labour against h
and all other cases for tax revenue and debt against u, since h = 1:5  u.
As can be seen, only the upward slopping part of the La¤er curve between
tax revenue from labour income and the labour income tax rates can be
obtained for tax rates that give well-dened solutions. However, as above,
the complementarities between labour and capital imply that both sides of
the total revenue and the debt La¤er curves are plausible.
[Figure 2a about here]
It is worth noting that the required increase in h in this case is higher
than the increase above, when only h is adjusted for the government to meet
the debt target. As can be seen in Figure 2a, this is because tax revenue from
unskilled labour increases with tax revenue from skilled labour, so that the
e¤ect of the decrease of capital tax revenue in total tax revenue is smaller.
This implies that the peak of the La¤er curve for total tax revenue, and
thus of the La¤er curve for debt as well, is now further to the right. For
symmetrically opposite reasons, the required fall in h is smaller in this case.
[Figures 2b and 2c about here]
5.4.1 Transition dynamics and welfare e¤ects
The welfare gains/losses are reported in Table 4 and the transition paths
from the pre- to the post-reform steady-state are plotted in Figures 2b and
2c. We rst consider the case of tax increases. Given the higher tax rates
compared to the case where only h is increased, the welfare losses, reported
in Table 4, are bigger for all agents under this policy regime, with unskilled
workers being the most hurt. This is because now unskilled labour income is
directly taxed. It is important to note, however, that these results indicate
that it is in the interest of skilled labour (i.e. skilled workers and capitalists)
not to increase the taxation of unskilled labour, if the policy changes take
the form of increases in labour tax rates. Both the capitalist and the skilled
worker are better o¤ in the case where only skilled labour income is taxed.
The dynamic transitions from the pre- to the post-reform steady-state are
very similar to the previous case, where h increased only. Consistent with
the previous discussion, there are important welfare losses for the capitalist
and the skilled workers under heterogeneous learning, and a small welfare
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gain for the unskilled worker in this scenario.
Table 4: Welfare costs/gains of reducing B=Y to 0:6
u = 0:365; h = 0:548 u = 0:189; h = 0:283
re al  re al 
Capitalist -0.1143 -0.1221 0.0089 -0.0020 -7.6e-04 -0.0012
Skilled -0.1634 -0.1670 0.0044 0.0092 0.0099 -6.6e-04
Unskilled -0.1274 -0.1259 -0.0018 0.0094 0.0090 3.3e-04
Aggregate -0.1433 -0.1461 0.0033 0.0072 0.0076 -4.5e-04
We next consider the case of decreases in the tax rates. For similar
reasons with the case of decreases in h, all agents are better o¤ with tax
cuts, compared to tax increases. As expected, unskilled labour prefers this
scenario to decreases in h only, while skilled labour (i.e. capitalists and
skilled workers) prefer the tax cuts in h only. What is more interesting is
that the capitalists are worse o¤, relative to the current steady-state, by a
decrease in all labour taxes (whereas they were better o¤ when h increased
only). By comparing Figures 2c to 1c, it is evident that this happens because
consumption has not increased by as much when all tax rates increase, and
the fall in leisure dominates. The reason is that the fall in u has increased the
unskilled labour supply and this has substituted for capital in the production,
so that the income of the capitalist under the new regime has not increased
su¢ ciently. In addition, consistent with the previous discussion, where only
h decreased, adaptive learning improves outcomes for the capitalist and
skilled worker, although the e¤ects are now smaller.
In the case of proportional changes in labour taxes, labour heterogene-
ity and the substitutability of capital with unskilled labour in the production
function result in one income group - the capitalist - opposing a fall in labour
taxes. However, since aggregate welfare increases after the decrease in labour
taxes, the welfare gains for skilled and unskilled workers are enough to com-
pensate the capitalists to obtain their consent for this tax change.39
5.5 La¤er curves in  k
In Figure 3a we plot the La¤er curves for tax revenue and debt, with respect
to the capital income tax rate. The relationship between tax revenue from
capital and the capital tax rate shows that the economy is on the downward
slopping part of this La¤er curve. Increasing  k decreases the tax revenue
39Note that falls in u only, imply a re of approximately  1 and  0:2 percent for the
capitalists and skilled workers respectively and of 1:8 percent for unskilled workers. The
implied s in this case are e¤ectively zero.
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collected from capital, while the reverse is true for decreases in  k. This is
consistent with data on e¤ective capital tax rates, which suggest that capital
taxation in the UK is much higher than the rest of Europe and the USA (see
e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2008), for a discussion of these data). However,
the debt La¤er curve indicates that it is possible to reduce debt by either
increasing ( k = 44:7%) or decreasing ( k = 7:8%)  k. This is because, total
tax revenue can fall by either increases or decreases in the capital tax rate.
[Figure 3a about here]
As can be seen in Figure 3b, increases in  k decrease the supply of capital
and, via the complementarities in the production function, tend to decrease
skilled labour supply as well. However, for the capitalists, who own the
biggest share of capital in the economy, the negative income e¤ects from
increased capital taxation dominate, so that their skilled labour supply in-
creases. More importantly, the substitutability between capital and unskilled
labour implies that, after the increase in the capital tax and the resulting fall
in capital supply, rms will substitute capital with unskilled labour in pro-
duction. Overall, these movements decrease tax revenue, so that the economy
is on the downward slopping part of the total revenue La¤er curve as well.
Hence, a lower debt-to-GDP target, which, as explained previously requires
a lower tax revenue in the long run, is consistent with an increase in  k.
[Figure 3b about here]
On the other hand, the decrease required in  k to reduce debt-to-GDP
to its target is very large, so that the required capital tax rate is outside of
the historical experience of the recent decades. The reason is that when  k
initially falls, tax revenue increases, due to the complementarities between
the tax bases, as discussed above. Namely, the increase in capital crowds-
in skilled labour and crowds-out unskilled labour, while the positive income
e¤ect decreases the labour supply of capitalists (see Figure 3c). Recall, that a
lower debt target for a given level of spending requires lower tax revenue due
to the fall in interest payments. Hence, the capital tax rate has to decrease
enough to take the economy back to the upward slopping part of the La¤er
curve.
[Figure 3c about here]
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5.5.1 Transition dynamics and welfare e¤ects
We rst present the results from increasing the capital income tax,  k, to
0:447 to achieve the debt target. The welfare losses for all agents under the
di¤erent scenarios are reported in Table 5.
Table 5: Welfare costs/gains of reducing B=Y to 0:6
 k = 0:447  k = 0:078
re al  re al 
Capitalist -0.0114 -0.0130 0.0016 0.3362 NL NL
Skilled -0.0062 -0.0071 8.8e-04 0.2990 NL NL
Unskilled 0.0031 0.0036 -4.4e-04 -0.1580 NL NL
Aggregate -0.0043 -0.0049 6.1e-04 0.1317 NL NL
As can be seen in Figure 3b, the post-reform economy implies less con-
sumption for capitalists and skilled workers, although the e¤ects are much
smaller compared to the case where the debt reduction was achieved by in-
creases in the labour income taxes The consumption of the unskilled workers
increases in the post-reform economy. In addition, work time falls for skilled
workers and increases for capitalists and unskilled labour, although the quan-
titative changes are again small. After the increase in the capital tax, rms
will substitute capital with unskilled labour in production. In addition, the
capitalists, who own the biggest share of capital in the economy and thus
su¤er the greatest loss in income due to the increase in  k, will increase their
labour e¤ort to make up for the loss in income. Skilled workers, on the other
hand, will reduce their labour supply, as the substitution e¤ects, from a lower
return to labour because of the lower capital base, dominate.
It is worth noting the importance of heterogeneity for the above results.
First, skilled labour responds to the capital tax changes di¤erently from un-
skilled labour, due to their di¤erent relationship (complements vs substitutes)
with capital. Second, the heterogeneity in capital holdings imply that the
income e¤ects dominate for the capitalist, as assets constitute a large share
of his resources, whereas substitution e¤ects dominate for the skilled labour.
As a result of the above, the capitalist and the skilled worker are worse o¤
after the capital tax increase, whereas unskilled labour is better o¤. However,
the di¤erences between the two pre- and post-reform economy are smaller,
compared to the case where labour taxes fall. This is reected in the wel-
fare losses under the increase in  k, which are smaller for the capitalist and
the skilled worker, under all cases considered, while, as noted, the unskilled
worker makes welfare gains in this regime. Therefore, all agents in the econ-
omy would prefer an increase in the capital tax, relative to the labour tax in
skilled labour and/or unskilled labour, to reduce the debt. Unskilled workers
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gain under the increase in capital taxes, because rms will nd it optimal to
substitute capital for unskilled labour, which explains, as already said, the
rise in the labour hours and consumption for the unskilled workers. In ad-
dition, note that the paths under heterogeneous learning deviate and again
over- and under-shoot the rational expectations solution. This is particu-
larly so for the capitalist and results in reductions in his welfare, compared
to rational expectations by about 0:16%. The additional gains/losses for the
other two agents are trivial.
It is useful to emphasise the importance of the nding that the welfare
losses for the capitalist and the skilled worker are lower under increased
capital taxation, than under increased labour taxation. This implies that it
is in the best interest of capitalists and skilled workers for capital and not
labour (especially unskilled) to be taxed by more. Therefore, it is benecial
in this case for the capital holders that unskilled labour is closing the welfare
gap with the other two socioeconomic groups.
We next consider the e¤ects of the reduction in  k to 7:8%. This implies
a very large increase in the capital stock, skilled labour and consumption of
both the capitalist and the skilled worker, which lead to a very big increase in
welfare for these two agents. Note that the results for welfare are comparable
to the results obtained for welfare from removing capital taxation in general
equilibrium models (see e.g. Lucas (1990) and Garcia-Mila et al. (2010)).
However, this change also implies a big cost for the unskilled workers. Capital
is substituting unskilled labour so that the welfare of the latter is signicantly
reduced. Unless unskilled labour is compensated by the capitalists and skilled
labour for its losses, it will not support cuts in capital taxes. Note that, from
the societys point of view, this would be desirable, as aggregate welfare
increases after the fall in capital tax, which suggests that the welfare gains for
capitalists and skilled workers are more than enough to compensate unskilled
labour.
Finally, note that given the very large di¤erences between the two steady-
states, adaptive learning (both under the homogeneous and heterogeneous
assumptions) does not imply well-dened solutions, because of the big fore-
cast errors and the unrealistic adjustments that they imply. E¤ectively, when
the learners start from the pre-reform economy, the post-reform steady-state
is not learnable.40
40Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006) suggest that policymakers should rule out policy
reforms that lead to unstable solutions under learning since in such cases economic agents
unsuccessfully try to correct their forecast functions over time and hence the economy fails
to converge to the desired rational expectations equilibrium.
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5.6 La¤er curves in all tax rates
Finally, we consider the case where the government changes all tax rates
proportionately to meet the debt target. Figure 4a shows the La¤er curves
for the tax revenue and debt with respect to all the tax rates. Note that the
horizontal axis of the total tax revenue and debt La¤er curves plots u, since
the other tax rates are given by h = 1:5  u,  k = 2:21  u.
[Figure 4a about here]
The La¤er curves for total tax revenue and debt are very similar to the
ones analysed above in the  k case, suggesting that the e¤ects of the changes
in  k are dominant. In this case, the outcome of the changes in the after
tax returns to factor inputs, results in increases in the supply of labour of
capitalists and unskilled workers and a decrease in capital supply and the
supply of skilled labour (see Figure 4b). After a decrease in the tax rates,
the capital stock and the labour supply of the capitalists increase, while the
labour input from skilled and unskilled workers decreases (see Figure 4c).
[Figures 4b and 4c about here]
5.6.1 Transition dynamics and welfare e¤ects
The welfare gains/losses are reported in Table 6 and as can be seen they are
qualitatively similar to the case of changes in  k. However, the welfare losses
are higher in this case for the capitalist and the skilled worker, compared to
the case where  k increases only. At the same time, the welfare gains are
lower for the unskilled worker. As this case is a mix of capital and labour
tax increases, the results fall between the two cases. Therefore, no agent in
the economy would prefer this case to the case where  k increases only.
Table 6: Welfare costs/gains of reducing B=Y to 0:6
u = 0:203; u = 0:170;
h = 0:304;  k = 0:448 h = 0:113;  k = 0:249
re al  re al 
Capitalist -0.0138 -0.0162 0.0024 0.2182 NL NL
Skilled -0.0100 -0.0113 0.0013 0.2680 NL NL
Unskilled 0.0015 0.0021 -6.4e-04 -0.0341 NL NL
Aggregate -0.0072 -0.0080 8.9e-04 0.1528 NL NL
Similarly, the welfare gains for the capitalist and the skilled worker are
lower when all tax rates fall, compared to a fall in  k only. At the same
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time, the losses for the unskilled worker are lower too. However, in terms
of aggregate welfare, this change in tax rates is better than a decrease in  k
only. Therefore, at the aggregate level, reducing the capital tax rate (and
taxing only labour) is not the preferred choice.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Using a heterogenous agent model under both rational expectations and
adaptive learning, we have addressed the issue on whether supply-side re-
forms consistent with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to
a more e¢ cient and equitable economy. To implement these tax reforms,
we calibrated the model so that the steady-state represented the current
UK economy and then simulated the model, under rational expectations and
bounded rationality, after a permanent change in a tax rate, starting from the
current, or pre-reform steady state. We evaluated welfare for each agent over
the transition period to the new, or post-reform steady state. The change in
the tax rate was chosen so that in the post-reform steady state the debt-to-
GDP ratio was 60%. As Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) have shown, when
a distorting income tax rate is chosen to close the government budget con-
straint, as we do for the post-reform steady state, there will be two long-run
equilibrium solutions for the tax rate, as long as there is a La¤er curve be-
tween tax revenue and the tax rates. We nd that both long-run solutions are
possible for the model UK economy and thus considered both increases and
decreases in the income tax rates. The complementarities and substitutabil-
ities between the capital and labour supplies of the heterogeneous agents are
critical in obtaining these multiple equilibria, since they imply that the La¤er
curve between total tax revenue and the tax rates is empirically plausible,
even though only the upward-slopping part of the curve is obtained for the
relationship between tax revenue from individual labour incomes and the tax
rates. We then welfare ranked these equilibria, across di¤erent tax reforms,
for the aggregate economy and for all types of agents.
Our modeling approach and analysis contributes some interesting and
useful results to a growing literature. First, we nd that even without in-
creases in the labour taxes to accompany capital tax decreases, the latter
imply a large increase in inequality. In particular, they result in big wel-
fare gains for the capitalists and skilled workers and big welfare losses for
the unskilled workers. Our quantitative results are comparable to those of
Garcia-Mila et. al. (2010) and lend further support to their conclusions.
However, the reason that unskilled labour is hurt in our model is because
of the substitutability between capital and unskilled labour in production.
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We also obtain the result, as in the literature, that a capital tax decrease is
benecial at the aggregate level. However, the distributional e¤ects referred
to above suggest that some compensation from the capitalists and skilled
workers to the unskilled workers would be required if the government did not
want to disadvantage one particular group in the economy.
Second, and more importantly, we nd a tax reform that is Pareto im-
proving. This corresponds to a fall in the taxation for skilled labour. An
increase in skilled labour supply, which follows a cut in skilled labour taxes,
increases the returns for capital and unskilled labour as well, given the com-
plementarities of skilled labour with the other two sources of production.
Third, we nd that if the menu of policies was restricted to considering
increases in tax rates, then increasing the tax rate on capital is preferred for
every agent in the economy since welfare losses are minimised for capitalists
and skilled workers and welfare gains are maximised for unskilled workers.
Therefore, the general message coming from our analysis is that if the gov-
ernment wants to increase taxes, it should increase the capital tax and if it
wants to decrease taxes, it should decrease the tax on skilled labour.
Fourth, we nd that heterogeneity in initial beliefs matters quantitatively
for the welfare losses/gains for the agents. In particular, the losses (gains) are
increased after rises (falls) in the tax rates, as the interaction of the initial
beliefs results in the economy overshooting and actually converging faster
to the new steady state, compared to the rational expectations solution.
Since the new steady state is worse (better) under tax increases (decreases),
learning under this form of heterogeneity in initial beliefs implies bigger losses
(gains). This is di¤erent from the results under homogeneous learning after
tax reforms, where convergence to the new equilibrium is faster under the
rational expectations solution (see e.g. Giannitsarou (2006)).
Finally, we nd that the UK economy is on the upward slopping part of
the La¤er curve for tax revenue from labour income, but on the downward
slopping side of the La¤er curve for tax revenue from assets and for total
tax revenue. Nevertheless, as discussed above, reducing capital taxes and/or
increasing labour taxes is a bad idea, if the goal is to increase welfare for all
agents.
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7 Appendix
7.1 E-Stability
E-stability determines the stability of the RE solution under a learning rule
such as RLS, in which the estimates ~x and ~z used in the PLM (29) are
adjusted slowly in the direction of the implied ALM parameters shown in
(31). In fact, if this adjustment process is completed, feeding the latest
estimates ~x and ~z in the two ALM parameters in (31) should yield exactly
the same two estimates for ~x and ~z. In such a case, these estimates must
be equal to the RE solution parameters x and z, since the model at hand
has a unique equilibrium.41 Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that such
condition can be veried by computing the following two matrices (associated
to x and z, respectively):
Qx =

(I M1x) 1M2
0 
 (I M1x) 1M1 ;
Qz = 
0 
 (I M1x) 1M1 (41)
and then testing if all their corresponding eigenvalues have real parts less
than one.
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Figure 1b: τh=0.477, B/Y=0.60
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Figure 1c: τh=0.271, B/Y=0.60
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Figure 2a: Laffer curves for proportional changes in τh & τu
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Figure 2b: τh=0.548, τu=0.365, B/Y=0.60
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Figure 2c: τh=0.283, τu=0.189, B/Y=0.60
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Figure 3a: Laffer curves for changes in τk
τk=0.078 τk=0.447
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Figure 3b: τk=0.447, B/Y=0.60
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Figure 3c: τk=0.078, B/Y=0.60
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Figure 4a: Laffer curves for proportional changes in all tax rates
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Figure 4b: τh=0.304, τu=0.203, τk=0.448, B/Y=0.60
0 50 100
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Bc
%
 
d
e
v
.
 
f
r
o
m
 
p
o
s
t
-
r
e
f
o
r
m
 
s
t
e
a
d
y
-
s
t
a
t
e
0 50 100
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Bs
0 50 100
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Kc
years
0 50 100
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Ks
0 50 100
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Cc
0 50 100
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Cs
%
 
d
e
v
.
 
f
r
o
m
 
p
o
s
t
-
r
e
f
o
r
m
 
s
t
e
a
d
y
-
s
t
a
t
e
0 50 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Cu
0 50 100
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
hc
years
0 50 100
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
hs
0 50 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
hu
 
 
RE pre-reform steady-state
Figure 4c: τh=0.170, τu=0.113, τk=0.249, B/Y=0.60
